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For immediate release May 5th, 2007 Contact: David Splinter 405-370-3431 Okies@okies.info Oklahoma Independents Support Redistricting Reform The Oklahoma Coalition of Independents supports Rep. Ryan McMullen’s (D-Burns Flat) recent call to allow Oklahomans to vote on an Independent Redistricting Commission. Consider the limited voter choice offered to Oklahoma voters and the large margin of victories in many races. · Half of all state legislative seats (62 of 125) went unopposed in the 2006 general election. Surprisingly, this is the recent average for midterm elections. · Three-quarters of legislative primaries go unopposed (www.okies.info/needchoice.html). · The recent average margin of victory for state Senate races in general elections was an astounding 28%. This is close to Henry's “landslide” 33% victory, but is the norm for Senate races. · The average margin of victory for state House races in Nov. 2006 was 24%. Why would so many races go unopposed? Why would the margin of victory be so wide? The answer is simple: partisan gerrymanders. When district lines are drawn by politicians, this allows them to pick which voters will live in their district. Uncompetitive districts are often a result.  A fairer system would put the power of drawing districts in someone else’s hands.  That is why twelve states and many other countries already use Independent Redistricting Commissions to keep politicians from drawing their own districts. Examples of stretched and contorted districts in Oklahoma are easy to come by. For example, House District 41 snakes from Yukon to north of Enid, and in areas is only six miles wide. At the national level, it is clear how redistricting often works to limit voter choice. According to Spencer Overton, author of Stealing Democracy: “Following the 2000 Census, 49 competitive congressional districts were significantly redrawn. 92% of incumbents representing these areas obtained safer districts and only 8% received more competitive districts.”  Rep. McMullen’s plan would call for “competitiveness” to be a consideration when drawing districts. He said, “80 House Districts are virtually safe from any kind of legitimate challenge from a member of a different party. That’s not how democracy is supposed to work! “Competitiveness” combined with an Independent Commission should provide Oklahoma a far more representative legislature and congressional delegation.” Rep. McMullen’s plan would allow Oklahomans to vote on forming an Independent Redistricting Commission. It would be composed of six voting members who are retired Oklahoma judges – three appointed by a Democratic governor and three by a Republican governor. He offered his plan as an amendment, which was defeated largely along party lines. OKIES Edmond Coordinator, Richard Prawdzienski, reacted to the Rep. McMullen's defeated amendment saying, “Republicans refusal to change in effect tells the Democrats ‘it is now get even time’ and tells us ‘it's party first, citizens second’.” Lynn Howell, state Chairman of Common Cause Oklahoma, commented on the current system: “Voters don’t choose politicians – politicians choose voters. It’s no wonder 60% of voting age Oklahomans stay home in mid-term elections.” Rep. McMullen is not the only one calling for reform. He said that Gov. Brad Henry, Senator Owen Laughlin (R-Woodward), and state Rep. John Trebilcock (R-Broken Arrow), have all expressed support for an Independent Redistricting Commission. Senator Kenneth Corn (D-Poteau) has also offered his own bill (SJR 12) to allow Oklahomans to vote on forming an Independent Redistricting Commission. In drawing districts, it would have members of the commission take into consideration "population, compactness, area, political units, historical precedents, economic and political interests and contiguous territory." The Oklahoma Coalition of Independents (OKIES) supports greater voter choice and policies that give voters a stronger say in government. # # # More Background on Redistricting “No invasions of the Constitution are fundamentally so dangerous as the tricks played on [Congress’] numbers, apportionment, and other circumstances respecting themselves....” — Thomas Jefferson, 1792. Common Cause National: Redistricting Page Fair Vote: Voting and Democracy Research Center on Redistricting Quotes from: Elbridge Gerry’s Salamander by Gary Cox and Jonathan Katz A Sketch of the Reapportionment Revolution The Court’s Decisions On March 26, 1962, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in the case of Baker v. Carr (369 US 186), thus initiating what has since been known as the reapportionment revolution. The suit was brought by urban plaintiffs in Tennessee, who challenged their state legislature’s failure to reapportion despite widespread population shifts that had made urban districts vastly more populous than their rural counterparts… The immediate consequence of Baker was more litigation. Indeed, within a year of the decision, all but 14 states were involved in reapportionment suits, and the Supreme Court used some of these cases to stake out a clearer substantive position…In Gray v. Sanders (37 US 268), handed down in 1963, the Court invalidated Georgia’s unit-rule primary elections specifically on the grounds that they did not give all voters an equal vopice and thus violated the Fourteenth Amendment. A year later the Court extended its “one person, one vote” principle to cover elections to both houses of all state legislatures (Reynolds v. Sims, 377 US 533) and election to the US House of Representatives (Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 US 1). (pg 12) Political Consequences of the Reapportionment Revolution In the United States during the 1960s, the boundaries of state legislative and congressional districts were established by state laws passed in the usual fashion. Thus, if one apry controlled both houses of the state legislature and the governor’s mansion, it could draw district lines to advantage its own candidates. In popular and academic jargon, redistricting plans that seek to maximize the gain of the redistricting party are know as partisan gerrymanders. If neither party controls the redistricting process, partisan gerrymanders may give way to incumbent-protecting gerrymanders, in which a bipartisan alliance redraws district lines so as to preserve or enhance the electoral prospects of current officeholders. Even when one party does control redistricting, its incumbents may oppose a partisan gerrymander, because typically such gerrymanders transfer “excess” votes from districts the party already holds to districts it wishes to capture. (pg 18) As Elliot (1970, p. 483) put it, “radical reapportionment overrides a legislature’s instinct for leacing the districts alone yet leaves unchecked the normal disposition of legislators to consult their own interests…there is every reason to believe that the Reapportionment Revolution brought with it something which none of the experts had thought of – a Gerrymandering Revolution.” …Overall, then, Elliot’s results suggest “that in the large states the districting power conferred on its possessor an advantage of 18.8 per cent extra seats in the 1966 and 1968 elections.” (pg. 19) How Anticipations of Redistricting Help Coordinate Entry Prior to Wesberry, redistrictings were virtually certain only in states that lost seats in the decennial reapportionment. In the other states, those that either held even or gained in the reapportionment, district lines were often preserved. After Wesberry, in contrast, everyone knew that redistrictings would occur at least once every 10 years. Moreover, virtually every district would be affected because populations shifts over the decade would leave almost no districts close enough to the new statewide average to satisfy the court’s equal-population mandate. At an aggregate level, the size of the change in political expectations should have been quite substantial. In 1952 and 1962, only 41% and 50% of all congressional districts were redrawn. In contrast, roughly 98% of all districts were redrawn in 1972, 1982, 1992. Thus, the probability that a district would be redrawn after a federal census doubled from before the apportionment revolution (.46) to afterward (.98). This doubling in the scope of the typical postcensus redistricting provided a stronger focal point in the competition between incumbents and strong challengers. Consider a strong challenger in 1970, 1980, or 1990. Both know that, two years hence, the state will likely redraw the district in which they currently sit. Will the challenger enter? Will the incumbent exit? (pp 162-163) Oklahoma House: Old Method http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oklahoma_House_of_Representatives Representation in the House used to be determined by taking the total population of the state, according to the most recent Federal Decennial Census, and that number was divided by one hundred, with the quotient equaling one ratio. Counties having a population less than one full ratio were to be assigned one Representative; every county containing an entire ratio but less than two ratios was to be assigned two Representatives; every county containing a population of two entire ratios but less than three ratios was to be assigned three Representatives; and every county containing a population of three entire ratios but less than four ratios was to be assigned four Representatives. After the first four Representatives, a county was to qualify for additional representation on the basis of two whole ratios of population for each additional Representative. New Method After the Constitutionally mandated method was found to be unconstitutional, a new method was instituted. Now the House has the power to draw its own district lines. Under the holding of Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) all districts must be apportioned within a five percent margin of the average target size district as determined by the U.S. Census population figures divided by the one hundred and one districts. This allows for some districts to be slightly smaller or larger than others. The House draws its own maps of its district lines, which are subject to the approval of both the Senate and the Governor. Should the redistricting not occur in the time limits prescribed by law, the lines are determined by a panel of five statewide elected officials. Senate: Old Method http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oklahoma_Senate Prior to a "one man, one vote" decisions of the United States Supreme Court in the 1960s and the court order which forced Oklahoma to equalize representation, Oklahoma was apportioned into forty-eight senatorial districts in the following manner: the nineteen most populous counties, as determined by the most recent Federal Decennial Census, were to constitute nineteen senatorial districts with one senator to be nominated and elected from each district. The fifty-eight less populous counties were to be joined into twenty-nine two-county districts with one senator to be nominated and elected from each of the two-county districts. In apportioning the Senate, the Oklahoma Constitution required that consideration be given to population, compactness, area, political units, historical precedents, economic and political interests, contiguous territory, and other major factors, to the extent feasible. Senate: New Method Currently, under the holding of Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) all districts must be apportioned within a five percent margin of the average target size district as determined by the U.S. Census population figures divided by the forty-eight districts. This allows for some districts to be slightly smaller or larger than others. The Senate draws its own maps of its district lines, which are subject to the approval of both the House of Representatives and the Governor. Should the redistricting not occur in a timely manner, the lines are determined by a panel of five statewide elected officials.

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Oklahoma Coalition of Independents
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Phone: 405-370-3431